Tackling Maoist Insurgency

UPSC Syllabus: GS-3-Internal security

Introduction

India has sharply weakened the Maoist movement through a combined push on security, development, and rights. Still, the core grievance—inequality and deprivation in tribal, forest, and remote districts—persists. Leadership losses, mass surrenders, and falling violence mark clear gains. But unless gaps in education, health, nutrition, land, and livelihoods close, the ideological spark may endure. The task now is to lock in security gains while delivering tangible improvements that reach every settlement. Tackling Maoist Insurgency.

Maoist insurgency in India

It began after Naxalbari (1967) and is driven by Maoist ideology that seeks to undermine the state through armed rebellion and parallel structures. It claims to fight for the marginalised, especially tribal communities, but employs violence, extortion, infrastructure sabotage, and recruitment.

It spread across the “Red Corridor”—Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Kerala, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and parts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Security forces, public assets, and democratic processes have been routine targets.

Current status of Maoist Insurgency

Leadership weakened: Maoist leadership has been decimated, and the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army is severely weakened.

Cadre losses and surrenders: This year till October 29, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) records 333 Maoists killed, 398 arrested, and 1,787surrenders.

Territorial contraction: The number of LWE-affected districts has shrunk to 11 (MHA), marking a sharp contraction of operational space.

Violence trend: Incidents fell from 1,936 (2010) to 374 (2024) (–81%). Deaths fell from 1,005 (2010) to 150 (2024) (–85%).

Gains happened: These gains reflect an integrated and holistic approach led by the Centre and signal the potential of police and CAPFs to defeat an insurgency.

Underlying concerns

1. Core grievances: People joined the Maoists to defend marginalised communities. Injustice from inequality, deprivation, and political exclusion still shapes daily life. Without redress, anger remains. Security gains alone cannot fix these social deficits. People want fair access to services and dignity.
2. Uneven development: Growth is strong but uneven. Rural, tribal, and forest areas lack steady access to land, schools, health care, and livelihoods. India ranks lowest in the G20 in per-capita GDP and in PPP terms. The Gini coefficient shows only modest change. Many benefits fail to reach remote hamlets.
3. Poor human development: Many LWE districts trail state and national averages. Malkangiri’s HDI is 0.37 against Odisha’s 0.579. In Gadchiroli, about one-third of under-five children are stunted or wasted, and over 60% of women of reproductive age are anaemic. Roads, banks, ITIs, and Eklavya schools exist, yet education, health, and nutrition outcomes remain weak.
4. Tribal rights and resource pressure: Tribal regions carry the costs of mining and projects. Forest Rights Act implementation is slow. Weak rights delivery breeds distrust.
5. Risk of ideological return: If injustice and exclusion continue, organised mobilisation may surface again, possibly in altered forms.

Government response

1. Security

• National Policy & Action Plan (2015): This provides the core multi-pronged strategy, combining area domination, targeted intelligence, development support, and rights delivery under one coordinated framework.
• Security-Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: The Centre reimburses states for key counter-LWE costs, including operations, training, rehabilitation of surrendered cadres, and community policing, ensuring steady funding for the front line.
• Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) and Fortified Police Stations: SIS strengthens intelligence branches and special forces, while fortified police stations harden vulnerable nodes; together they improve response times and officer safety in remote zones.
• Financial Choke using NIA/ED: Focused probes cut extortion and logistics chains, reducing the insurgency’s ability to procure arms, move funds, and intimidate local contractors.

2. Infrastructure & Connectivity

• Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I): Strategic roads in core LWE states open access for security movement and bring markets, health, and schooling closer to isolated habitations.
• Road Connectivity Project in LWE Areas (RCPLWE): Complementing RRP-I, this project links interior villages to district hubs, protecting both routine service delivery and build-out of welfare assets.
• Telecom Saturation Projects: New towers and backhaul upgrades extend mobile coverage, enabling 112/ambulance access, digital payments, e-governance, and better operational coordination.
• Special Central Assistance (SCA): Flexible district funds close last-mile gaps—small bridges, solar lights, anganwadi repairs, and PHC upgrades—so citizens see tangible, near-term improvements.

3. Rights, Inclusion & Community Trust

• Aspirational Districts (MHA-monitored): Focused tracking of outcomes in priority LWE districts aligns line departments and accelerates problem-solving at the field level.
• Skills & Education Stack (ITIs/SDCs/EMRS): Local skilling and residential schooling raise employability and reduce youth vulnerability to recruitment.
• Rehabilitation of Surrendered Cadres: Time-bound benefits, training, and placement support ease reintegration and signal credible alternatives to violence.
• Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan: Saturation of personal amenities in tribal villages—paired with road, mobile, and finance access—converts security gains into everyday welfare, deepening trust.

Way Forward

1. Focus on Development- The successful implementation of development projects in Andhra Pradesh and Telanganareduced Maoist insurgency. Thus we must focus more on the effective implementation of development projects.
2. Strengthen Local Governance- Empowering local governments to address grievances and deliver public services effectively, as seen in the Panchayati Raj system’s success in reducing Naxalism in West Bengal, can help build trust between communities and authorities.
3. Enhance Security Forces’ Capabilities: Provide specialized training and better equipment to security personnel, similar to the Greyhounds force in Andhra Pradesh, which proved effective in countering Maoist insurgency due to their specialized training and local knowledge.
4. Encourage Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution: Engage in meaningful dialogue with Maoist groups to address their grievances, similar to the peace talks between the Indian government and Naga insurgents, which led to a ceasefire and reduced violence in the region.
5. Foster Community Engagement: Involve local communities in decision-making processes and development projects, as seen in the success of the Janmabhoomi program in Andhra Pradesh, where community participation helped build trust and reduce Maoist influence.
6. Ensure Accountability and Transparency- Strengthen measures to prevent corruption and human rights abuses, as demonstrated by the National Human Rights Commission’s interventions in cases of alleged human rights violations by security forces, which can help restore public trust in government institutions.

Conclusion

Security pressure has reduced violence, shrunk territory, and fractured leadership. Durable peace now requires education, health, nutrition, land and forest rights, and decent work in affected villages. If security operations stay firm and human development accelerates, LWE can end sustainably—fewer attacks and fewer reasons for anyone to return to violence.

Question for practice:

Examine how India’s multi-pronged strategy has weakened the Maoist insurgency, and discuss the remaining socio-economic challenges that must be addressed to ensure lasting peace.

Source: Indian Express