Pakistan-Afghanistan ties: Long history of differences, from Durand Line to the India angle

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 2 –India and its neighbourhood- relations.

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan have largely lived with mutual distrust, periodic armed clashes, and competing national narratives since 1947. The recent border flare-up along the Durand Line shows how historical grievances, Pashtun identity, cross-border militancy, and trade/transit coercion keep relations tense. India’s presence as a perceived balancer or threat adds another layer, shaping choices in Kabul and Islamabad and amplifying disagreements over sovereignty, security, and regional alignment. Pakistan-Afghanistan ties: Long history of differences, from Durand Line to the India angle.

About Durand Line

1. Formation (1893): In 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand (Foreign Secretary of British India) and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan agreed to a boundary to divide spheres of influence between British India and Afghanistan. It split Pashtun (and Baloch) communities across a roughly 2,640 km line.
2. Colonial interpretation: After drawing the line, British India treated it as a fixed border for governance and security. But an Afghan thesis argues it set spheres of influence, not a permanent boundary.
3. 1947 inheritance and rejection:

When Pakistan was created in 1947, it inherited the British position that the Durand Line was the international boundary.

Afghanistan rejected this view and even opposed Pakistan’s entry into the UN, arguing the line unfairly divided tribes and had been imposed under pressure.

4. Cold War flashpoints (1950s–1970s):

Prime Minister Daud Khan promoted Pashtunistan (merging Pakistan’s Pashtun areas with Afghanistan).

In 1961, border closures by Pakistan caused shortages in Afghanistan and pushed Kabul closer to the Soviet Union.

Daud’s 1973 presidency briefly revived Pashtunistan, but he later dropped it under Pakistani pressure.

By 1976, Daud and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto normalised ties, yet Afghanistan still did not recognise the Durand Line as an international border.

5. Post-2001 to recent years:

Pakistan’s border-fence construction (from 2017) deepened tensions over control and access.

In 2018, President Ashraf Ghani protested Pakistan’s abolition of the Tribal Agencies, reflecting continuing disagreement over border governance.

Reason for disputes

1. Recognition: Pakistan treats the Durand Line as an international border. Afghanistan rejects that. The line split Pashtun (and Baloch) communities and remains porous. Recognition is unresolved and fuels clashes.
2. Connectivity concern : Afghanistan is landlocked. Pakistan is the preferred route but blocks India–Afghanistan road trade via Wagah and has stopped Afghan goods through land routes and Karachi port at times. Connectivity is used as pressure.
3. Ethnic and insurgent dimensions: Ending the Tribal Agencies is seen by many Pashtuns as an insult from a Punjab-dominated state. Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns share kinship. TTP gains sympathy across the border. This keeps security tensions high.
4. The “gratitude” question: Pakistan says it hosted refugees and backed Mujahideen and later the Taliban, so Afghans should be grateful. Many Afghans say Pakistan acted for its own interests and treated Afghans poorly. This disagreement deepens bitterness.
5. Recent incident: On October 12, Kabul claimed 58 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 25 posts were captured along the border, citing Pakistani violations. Afghan officials earlier alleged airstrikes by Pakistan, which Islamabad has not confirmed. This is among the most serious escalations since 2021.

Impact of dispute over Durand Line

1. Economic disruption: Border skirmishes disrupt cross-border trade, hurting communities reliant on trans-frontier movement. Periodic closures and port holds squeeze Afghan markets and erode trust.
2. Humanitarian stresses: Communities reliant on cross-border markets face price spikes, loss of daily income, and uncertainty about access to goods and services. Port holds and intermittent land-route blockages erode trust and deepen local hardship.
3. Diplomatic strain: Successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban regime, have refused formal recognition of the line. Without a political framework to manage disputes, flare-ups will continue and destabilise the region..
4. Regional security spillovers: Crisis contagion rises across the frontier. Clashes can spread quickly along a porous, rugged border. Movement of armed groups, including the TTP, complicates counter-terrorism and heightens miscalculation risk during standoffs. Repeated post-2021 flare-ups show how fast incidents escalate into serious confrontations.
5. Institutional pressure: The cyclical tensions strain governance capacity on both sides—absorbing security resources, disrupting routine administration, and crowding out problem-solving.

Way forward for India

1. Overall stance: Stay watchful, not panicked. Keep plans ready for quick shifts along the India–Pakistan frontier.
2. Security: Harden vulnerable border points and key infrastructure. Step up monitoring for militant spillovers. Keep rapid-response units and mission security on readiness.
3. Diplomacy: Work with active mediators (China, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) to contain escalation. Use quiet channels to support hotlines and “freeze-in-place” understandings. Back practical border-management steps without taking a view on legal recognition.
4. Engagement with Afghanistan: Respect Kabul’s independent choices. Keep engagement focused on stability, civilian protection, and predictable trade so it does not feed an encirclement narrative.
5. Connectivity: Expect periodic closures and port holds. Press for predictable transit and non-coercive connectivity in all dialogues.
6. Humanitarian/Consular: Prepare for refugee flows and risks of civilian harm along the frontier. Strengthen consular support and evacuation planning for Indian nationals.
7. Public messaging: Avoid escalatory rhetoric and keep communication calm, with an emphasis on de-escalation.

Conclusion

A durable peace requires a political framework to manage the Durand Line dispute, reduce coercive transit practices, and address Pashtun grievances that fuel militancy. Recognition of Kabul’s policy autonomy, predictable trade/transit, and practical border management can lower risks. Without such steps, clashes will recur, economic pain will persist, and the India factor will keep magnifying tensions rather than enabling regional stability.

Question for practice:

Examine how the Durand Line dispute has shaped Pakistan–Afghanistan relations since 1947, and what response India should adopt.

Source: Indian Express