Global Nuclear Order

UPSC Syllabus- GS 2 – India and international order

Introduction

The global nuclear order shows a sharp contradiction: nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 and arsenals have declined, yet stability is weakening. A small nuclear club has remained intact, but modernisation, ambiguous testing signals, and weakening treaties now strain this system. Recent statements by Donald Trump about resuming U.S. nuclear testing, combined with expanding capabilities across major powers and a failing CTBT framework, suggest that long-standing restraint is under serious pressure.

Changed in the global Nuclear Order

1. Non-use and shrinking arsenals: Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the only wartime uses, and since the late 1970s stockpiles have fallen sharply.
2. A small and stable nuclear club: Early fears of two dozen nuclear-armed states did not materialise. Today, nine states possess nuclear weapons, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and four later entrants.
3. Achievements under strain: These patterns look like success but do not inspire celebration. The nuclear order appears fragile, and moves and statements by Donald Trump are seen as weakening its supports.

Nuclear Testing is Re-emerging as a Threat

1. Trump’s Testing Signal: Recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump about restarting U.S. nuclear testing have injected fresh uncertainty. He claimed that other countries are testing and ordered the “Department of War” to begin tests
2. Modernisation Without Explosions

• The U.S., Russia, and China are simultaneously designing and developing new nuclear weapons.
• Russia has tested the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon underwater nuclear-powered torpedo.
• China is developing hypersonic missiles and a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle.
• The U.S. is producing new warheadslike the B61-13 gravity bomb and W76-2 warhead, and working on a new submarine-launched cruise missile.
• These programmes increase pressure to move from lab work to fresh explosive tests.

3. Doctrinal shift: Nuclear doctrines are being reworked to deal with cyber and space technologies and new missile defence ideas such as the U.S. “golden dome”. Together, these changes blur lines between conventional and nuclear use and raise doubts about the future of the nuclear taboo.
4. Risk of Breaking the Taboo: If any major power resumes explosive testing, others are likely to follow, undermining the CTBT norm and increasing the chances of a new nuclear arms race.

Conventions Regulate the Global Nuclear Order?

1. Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968- It was put forward by the USA, UK and USSR. It was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The treaty has 3 pillars:
   (a) Non-proliferation- Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology and Non-nuclear Weapon States pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons;
   (b) Disarmament- All parties to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures to control nuclear arms race, and to general and complete disarmament;
   (c) Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy- The Treaty recognizes the right of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
   India considers the treaty discriminatory as it creates a club of ‘nuclear haves‘ and a larger group of ‘nuclear have-nots‘ by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967. India hasn’t signed the treaty.
2. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)- Seeks to ban all nuclear explosions for both civilian and military purposes. It prohibits nuclear testing, thus preventing further advancement of nuclear weapons capabilities.
3. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017- It prohibits and makes it illegal to possess, use, produce, transfer, acquire, stockpile or deploy nuclear weapons. States are also prohibited from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It came into force in 2021.
4. Export Control Groupings- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regimes (MTCR) are some of the nuclear export control groupings. These ensure that nuclear fuel export doesn’t result in nuclear weapons development.
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement- Governs the verification and inspection of nuclear facilities to ensure they are used for peaceful purposes and not for the development of nuclear weapons.

CTBT Framework is Failing

1. Incomplete ratification and geopolitical deadlock

• The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has still not entered into force 29 years after negotiation.
• It has 187 signatories, but key states such as the U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, and Iran have not ratified it.
• Russia ratified and then withdrew ratification in 2023. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have neither signed nor ratified. Given current geopolitics, entry into force is highly unlikely, leaving the treaty politically weak.

2. Ambiguity: The CTBT tells states not to carry out “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”, but these terms were never formally defined.
3. Shift from disarmament to non-proliferation: CTBT began as a first step towards nuclear disarmament, but during 1995–96 negotiations it was recast mainly as a non-proliferation tool. Nuclear-weapon states kept their arsenals and focused on stopping others, weakening political support among non-nuclear states.
4. Allegations, monitoring, and eroding trust:

• In 2019-20, the U.S. State Department said Russia and China “may have conducted low-yield tests” inconsistent with the U.S. standard.
• The CTBT Organisation, using a network of over 300 monitoring stations in 89 countries, reported no inconsistent activity.
• This gap between political claims and technical findings undermines trust in both national assessments and international monitoring. As confidence falls, the norm against nuclear explosive testing becomes more fragile.

It’s Impacts

1. Strategic Stability: Unclear rules on testing and new technologies make nuclear relations more unstable. Misunderstandings and miscalculations between major powers may grow, especially in crises.
2. Arms race revival: China’s rapid arsenal expansion, U.S.–Russia modernisation, and possible end of New START point to a fresh nuclear arms race rather than gradual disarmament.
3. Erosion of treaties and norms: Weakening of the CTBT and strain on the NPT reduce legal and moral barriers against testing and proliferation.
4. Regional ripple effects: If major powers resume explosive tests, India and Pakistan are likely to follow, intensifying South Asian nuclear risks.
5. Threat to nuclear taboo: More “usable” nuclear options and changing doctrines in cyber and space domains put the eight-decade taboo against nuclear use under pressure.

Way forward

1. Crafting a new nuclear framework: The earlier nuclear order grew in a very different 20th-century setting. Today’s world is more fractured and multipolar, yet nuclear dangers remain high. A new framework must reflect current power shifts and new technologies, while firmly keeping nuclear use outside the realm of acceptable options.
2. Reviving arms control and restraint: States need to bring back serious arms control thinking, update nuclear rules, and rebuild habits of transparency, dialogue, and restraint. These habits once helped to manage rivalry and can do so again.
3. Putting non-use and risk reduction first: The main goal must be to prevent any nuclear use. Countries should avoid actions that raise the chance of miscalculation, including vague testing signals and systems that shorten decision time.
4. Heeding UN warnings on nuclear risk: The UN Secretary-General has warned that nuclear risks are already “alarmingly high” and urged states to avoid steps that could trigger catastrophic escalation.

Conclusion

The nuclear order built on decades of restraint is under strain as Donald Trump’s testing signals, renewed arms racing, and treaty erosion weaken past gains. Preventing any nuclear use must remain the core priority. A realistic, updated nuclear framework, guided by UN warnings about “alarmingly high” risks, is essential to protect the taboo against nuclear use.

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Question for practice:

Discuss how renewed nuclear testing signals and weakening arms-control treaties are undermining the stability of the global nuclear order.

Source: The Hindu