India China relations and the unresolved border challenge

Source: The post India China relations and the unresolved border challenge has been created, based on the article “Should India overlook boundary issues while normalising ties with China?” published in “ The Hindu” on 19 September 2025. India China relations and the unresolved border challenge.

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 2 – India and its Neighborhood- Relations.

Context: A high-level Modi–Xi meeting at the SCO summit restarted trade and air links and stressed border calm. It followed five years after Galwan and months after Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, prompting a debate on whether normalization can proceed without a boundary settlement.

For detailed information on India-China Relations – Significance & Challenges read this article here

What triggered the current reset?

1. SCO meeting outcomes: Both leaders agreed to resume trade and air connectivity. They stressed peace and tranquility along the border as an enabler for progress elsewhere.
2. Framing the relationship: They reaffirmed being “development partners, not rivals.” Readouts differed on the border’s salience, showing divergent priorities.
3. Post-Galwan context: The decisions follow the 2020 clashes that broke earlier understandings on LAC stability. Diplomacy and military talks since then aimed to restore 1990s-style management.
4. Operation Sindoor backdrop: The meeting came after India’s operation against Pakistan, with Chinese support to Pakistani forces shaping perceptions.

Can ties normalise without fixing the border?

1. 1988 template and LAC peace: In 1988, after Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, both sides pursued cooperation while managing the dispute. The core condition was maintaining calm along the LAC.
2. China’s earlier reluctance: While India wanted the border issue to be resolved (as part of normalising ties), China was more reluctant to do so (and wanted to set the issue aside for the time being). In the 1990s too, both countries agreed to maintain peace and tranquility (along the LAC)..
3. Galwan’s rupture and partial repair: Galwan upended the arrangement. Talks since then tried to recreate stabilizing mechanisms.
4. 2024 Border Patrol Agreement: This is seen as an icebreaker. India views restored patrolling rights in Demchok and Depsang as a gain. China claims no sovereignty change, describing cross-patrolled buffer zones after earlier non-patrolled buffers.

What could derail the current thaw?

1. Risk of a renewed clash: A fresh confrontation like “Galwan-2” would rupture engagement. It would revive distrust, harden public opinion, and overshadow gains in trade and connectivity.
2. Signals of hierarchy and diminished parity: Beijing’s quest for global primacy and reluctance to treat India as a peer deepen asymmetry. Wang Yi’s elevation of Pakistan signalled priority and hierarchy, which weakens confidence in parity.
3. Military build-up and cost imposition: The PLA’s rapid build-up on the Tibetan Plateau forces India to fortify and garrison the LAC year-round. This acts as a cost-imposition strategy and keeps risks elevated.
4. Low appetite for a final settlement: Beijing shows limited interest in resolving the boundary. Special Representatives meet, yet three decades of scant movement—and the unanswered “why” of Galwan 2020—sustain uncertainty.

How do Chinese perceptions of India shape Beijing’s behaviour?

1. Narratives explaining 2020: Chinese sources cite the dilution of Article 370 and fear of supply-chain displacement during COVID-era U.S.–China tensions. Framing India as aligning with the U.S. invites defensive and punitive measures.
2. From bystander to competitor: India’s scale, growth momentum, and demographic dividend changed assessments. Past condescension gave way to caution, and India is viewed as a potential competitor.
3. Restrictive economic mood: Beijing shows an impulse to curb investments, tighten export controls, and constrain technology flows to slow India’s catch-up. These levers reinforce a harder border posture.
4. Effects on border conduct: Seeing India as a rising competitor hardens negotiating stances. It also encourages tighter tactical behaviour along the LAC.

Can China’s South Asia designs coexist with India–China normalisation?

1. Shift from bilaterals to trilaterals: Beijing is pivoting to trilateral formats, including Pakistan–Afghanistan–China and efforts with Bangladesh and Pakistan. These platforms consolidate regional influence.
2. Strategic intent and implications: The aim is to pre-empt a future Indian rivalry by shaping outcomes without Indian consent. Such mechanisms can circumscribe India’s options.
3. Spillover into the bilateral track: Regional manoeuvres blur into bilateral dealings. They make it harder to insulate normalisation from competitive pressures.
4. Scale of China’s lead: The Economic Survey 2024–25 notes China’s manufacturing output is nearly 45% of the global total, including dominance in electric vehicles and critical minerals. This structural interdependence supports engagement.

Question for practice:

Examine whether India can normalise ties with China without resolving the boundary issue.