Recently, the Maoist insurgency in India suffered a serious blow from paramilitary and police forces which included the killing of at least 29 Maoists in the Bastar region in Chhattisgarh. The operation is the largest in terms of Maoists’ bodies recovered and is among the biggest successes for security forces in their decades-long fight against Maoist insurgency and left-wing extremism (LWE).
What is Maoist insurgency in India? Where is it prevalent in India?
Maoist insurgency- Maoist insurgency, which is also known as Left-wing Extremism (LWE)/Naxalism, is an armed movement rooted in political ideologies that seek to bring about socio-political and economic changes through violent means.
Prevalence of Maoist Insurgency/ Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)
The Maoist Insurgency/Left Wing Extremism has been a long standing security threat which started in 1967 and gradually spread to different parts of the country. The Maoist insurgency peaked in the early mid-2000s.
However, with the government’s continued push to end the Maoist insurgency through the mix of anti Naxal Operations and Welfare measures for the tribals, has started showing results. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) website, Left wing extremism has been limited to 70 districts in the country. Out of these 70 districts, 25 districts are ‘Most LWE affected Districts’.
Now the LWE has been limited to the jungles of central India and places of sparse tribal presence with a weaker presence of the developmental and welfare state relative to the rest of the country. The prevalent area of LWE is called ‘Red Corridor‘. This region stretches across several states, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, West Bengal, and parts of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Maharashtra.
What are the reasons that led to the growth of Left-Wing Extremism in India?
The 2006 D Bandopadhyay Committee identified governance gaps and extensive discrimination against tribals in economic, socio-political, and cultural spheres as the primary causes of Naxalism’s proliferation. Some of the reasons are enumerated below-
1.Inequitable Socio-economic development- Increasing Socio-economic inequities and unemployment in hinterland region nudge the youth to take up arms. There has been disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities.
2.Governance failure- Governance deficit in the remote parts of Red Corridor regions led to the growth of Left Wing Extremism. There was development apathy and huge corruption in the red corridor area. For ex- Lack of food security due to corruption in the PDS scheme.
3.Political Marginalization- The tribal groups were politically marginalized by the self-serving dominant groups. This led to political deprivation among the marginalized groups leading to hopelessness and a sense of powerlessness.
4.Land Alienation and Displacement- There was failure of land reforms especially in land redistribution after independence. The development projects and acquisition of land for industrial purposes have sometimes led to the displacement of local communities without adequate compensation or rehabilitation. This has been a focal point of Naxalite agitation.
5.Discrimination against tribals- There has been poor implementation of laws prohibiting transfer of tribal land to non-tribals in the Fifth Schedule areas. Non-regularisation and hasty rejections of land grants of traditional land rights under FRA, 2006 have also led to the growth of left-wing Extremism.
What are the challenges posed by Left-wing extremism (LWE) in India?
1. Threat to Internal Security- Left-wing extremism poses significant internal security threats to India, leading to violent clashes and loss of lives among security forces and civilians. For ex- Maoist rebels engaging in deadly attacks on security forces in remote areas like Dantewada.
2. Social and Economic Disruption- LWE in India disrupts social and economic development in affected regions, hindering infrastructure and welfare projects. For ex- Maoists targeting their roads, schools, and other vital infrastructure to maintain control over their territories.
3. Forced Recruitment and Child Soldiers- Maoist groups have been known to force vulnerable individuals, including children, to join their ranks, exploiting them for their cause. This practice violates human rights and disrupts the lives of countless innocent people.
4. Extortion and Illegal Activities- LWE groups often engage in extortion and other illegal activities to fund their operations. For ex- Demands of ‘protection money‘ from local businesses, leading to economic stagnation in affected areas.
5. Political Instability- Maoist insurgency contributes to political instability in India, as the affected regions struggle with governance issues and weakened trust in democratic institutions. This can undermine the overall stability of the country.
6. Human Rights Violations- LWE groups have been known to commit human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, abductions, and torture. These actions not only harm innocent civilians but also tarnish India’s international reputation.
7. Alienation of Tribal Populations: Maoist insurgents often exploit and alienate tribal population in their stronghold, creating a cycle of violence and mistrust between the communities and the government. This makes it difficult to address the root causes of extremism and to foster long-term peace and stability.
What are the various government policies to control Maoist insurgency in India?
The Indian government has employed various approaches to control Left-wing extremism (LWE), focusing on a combination of security, development, and political initiatives. Some of these approaches include:
Security Schemes for LWE
National Policy and Action Plan to address Left Wing Extremism 2015 | This comprehensive action plan aims to enhance the capabilities of security forces to combat LWE. This action plan ensures that the rights and entitlements of local communities are safeguarded and focuses on socio-economic development in affected regions. |
SAMADHAN Doctrine | SAMADHAN Doctrine encompasses the entire strategy of government from short-term policy to long-term policy formulated at different levels. SAMADHAN stands for S– Smart Leadership, A– Aggressive Strategy, M– Motivation and Training, A– Actionable Intelligence, D– Dashboard Based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas), H– Harnessing Technology, A– Action plan for each Theatre, N– No access to Financing. |
Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme | Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, the Central Government reimburses the Security Related Expenditure of 10 LWE affected States. These security related expenditures are related to training and operational needs of security forces, ex-gratia payment to the family of civilians/security forces killed/injured in LWE violence, rehabilitation of surrendered LWE cadres, community policing, village defence committees and publicity materials. |
Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) | Under this scheme, funds are being provided to States for strengthening the infrastructure related to Security. Under this scheme 250 Fortified Police Stations are being constructed. |
Development Schemes for LWE
Road Connectivity Project for LWE affected areas (RCPLWE) | The Government introduced this scheme in 2016 for improving road connectivity in LWE affected States. The roads included under the scheme have been identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs in consultation with the State Governments and the security agencies. 8124 km roads and 306 bridge works have been completed under this scheme. |
LWE Mobile Tower Project | This project has been launched to improve mobile connectivity in the LWE affected areas. The aim is to improve the communication network for better governance delivery. |
Aspirational District Programme | The Ministry of Home Affairs has been tasked with the monitoring of Aspirational districts programme in 35 LWE affected districts. Government has implemented various welfare and development schemes to address the root causes of LWE, such as poverty, unemployment, and social inequality in these aspirational districts. |
Socio-Political Schemes for LWE
Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 | Through this act government aims to strengthen local governance in LWE-affected areas by promoting democratic participation and empowering local institutions. |
Civic Action Programme (CAP) | This Scheme aims to bridge the gaps between Security Forces and local people through personal interaction and bring the human face of Security Forces before the local population. The CAPFs deployed in LWE affected areas are provided funds for conducting civic activities for the welfare of the local people. |
Media Plan | Government is implementing this Scheme in LWE affected areas to counter the false propaganda of Maoists. Under this scheme activities like Tribal Youth Exchange programmes are organised by NYKS along with radio jingles, documentaries and pamphlet distribution. |
Inter-State Coordination | The government is promoting coordination among states affected by LWE to ensure a unified response. For Ex- Regular meeting of Union Home minister with the CMs and DyCMs of all LWE states. |
Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies | Government has introduced surrender and rehabilitation policies for LWE cadres willing to renounce violence and join mainstream society. These policies offer financial incentives, vocational training, and support for reintegration into society. |
What are issues associated with government measures to control LWE?
1. Human Rights Violations- Security operations against Maoist insurgency have sometimes led to human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and harassment of civilians. These actions can alienate local communities and create resentment against the government.
2. Inadequate Implementation of Development Schemes- Despite numerous welfare and development programs, their implementation in LWE-affected areas is often hampered by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a lack of coordination between various agencies. As a result, the intended benefits may not reach the affected communities.
3. Insufficient Capacity Building of Security Forces- The security forces sometimes lack specialized training, equipment, and intelligence support to effectively tackle Maoist insurgency. This sometimes leads to operational failures and increased casualties among security personnel.
4. Reliance on Force- Excessive focus on security operations overshadows the need for political engagement and dialogue with LWE groups. A purely militaristic approach could prolong the conflict and hinder efforts to find a peaceful resolution.
5. Incomplete Rehabilitation Programs- While surrender and rehabilitation policies exist, they are not effectively implemented. There are certain cases of Inadequate support for reintegration such as insufficient vocational training or financial assistance.
6. Lack of Trust and Cooperation- Mistrust between the government and affected communities hinders the implementation of development initiatives and security operations. Building trust is crucial for fostering cooperation and addressing the root causes of LWE.
7. Political Instability and Opportunism: Political instability and opportunism undermines efforts to address LWE. Politicians often exploit the issue for electoral gains. This further complicates the government’s response to the problem.
Read More- Tackling the Maoists: On left-wing extremism |
What should be done to effectively control Left Wing Extremism in India?
1. Focus on Development- The successful implementation of development projects in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana reduced Maoist insurgency. Thus we must focus more on the effective implementation of development projects.
2. Strengthen Local Governance- Empowering local governments to address grievances and deliver public services effectively, as seen in the Panchayati Raj system’s success in reducing Naxalism in West Bengal, can help build trust between communities and authorities.
3. Enhance Security Forces’ Capabilities: Provide specialized training and better equipment to security personnel, similar to the Greyhounds force in Andhra Pradesh, which proved effective in countering Maoist insurgency due to their specialized training and local knowledge.
4. Encourage Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution: Engage in meaningful dialogue with Maoist groups to address their grievances, similar to the peace talks between the Indian government and Naga insurgents, which led to a ceasefire and reduced violence in the region.
5. Foster Community Engagement: Involve local communities in decision-making processes and development projects, as seen in the success of the Janmabhoomi program in Andhra Pradesh, where community participation helped build trust and reduce Maoist influence.
6. Ensure Accountability and Transparency- Strengthen measures to prevent corruption and human rights abuses, as demonstrated by the National Human Rights Commission’s interventions in cases of alleged human rights violations by security forces, which can help restore public trust in government institutions.
Read More- The Hindu UPSC Syllabus- GS 3: Security Issues – Linkages between development and spread of extremism. |
Discover more from Free UPSC IAS Preparation Syllabus and Materials For Aspirants
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.